

Space Data Corporation


Air-To-Ground Proceeding WT Docket No. 03-103

Eric Frische
Chief Technology Officer

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Stratospheric SkySite Platforms Are Effectively 20-Mile-High “Towers”


One SkySite® = 300 towers & users keep same device



Space Data's Coverage Solution

Wireless repeaters on weather balloons at 100,000 ft provide complementary coverage to towers




- Leverages 60+ yrs of weather balloon operations
- Uses existing inexpensive user devices
- Fills in coverage gaps
- Roaming onto towers for urban coverage
- FCC/FAA approved
- Environmentally benign & safe



Space Data's Current System

Currently deployed 24 x 7 operation

- Oil & gas telemetry
 - 75,000 wells need new service due to loss of CDPD
- Local / regional fleet tracking
- A single SkySite® covers a 420-mile diameter circle





Each SkySite rises to 100,000 feet and levels off. In the uniform winds at that altitude, a constellation of interlocking SkySites® float in unison to blanket large regions with coverage. New SkySites® are launched every 12-24 hours to replace the previous constellation which is taken down, recovered and reused.



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Initial System Applications

- Telemetry
 - Oil wells & pipelines
 - Irrigation control
 - Remote security
 - Telematics
 - Road side assistance
 - Air bag notification
 - Location services
 - Asset tracking
 - GPS vehicle location
-
- 2-way wireless email
 - Text messaging
 - Enterprise applications



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ATG Licensing Proposals

- Two exclusive 1.5/2.5MHz licenses (FCC Staff)
 - 2.5 MHz license can support CDMA technology.
 - 1.5 MHz license can support narrowband technologies such as iDEN and GSM to provide a variety of services, including voice, Internet access, and SMS to ATG customers.
 - Stratospheric platforms are ideally suited for providing ATG services in either 1.5 or 2.5 MHz.
 - Incumbent's operations can be protected during the transition to the new licensing scheme.

ATG Licensing Proposals

- Exclusive 4 MHz license (Verizon Airfone)
 - Retains absence of ATG competition.
- 2-4 overlapping 2.5 MHz licenses (AirCell & Boeing)
 - Significant technical risk.
 - Inflexible design.
 - Rigid fixed site locations.
 - Significant, ongoing technical coordination between licensees will make it difficult for licensees to react to changes in market demands and new technological developments.
 - Requires the FCC to promulgate detailed base station location, sharing, and interference requirements. Requirements become even more complicated to craft if each licensee uses different technologies and protocols.

Two-Exclusive ATG License Approach Produces Best Outcome

- Solves all shared spectrum problems.
 - Promotes competition in the ATG market.
 - Flexibility for licensees to scale networks in response to market demand.
 - Technologically neutral / not locked in to specific technologies, protocols, or pace of development.
 - Administratively and technologically simple to implement.
 - Avoids complex interference and sharing requirements and potential restrictions on future expansion or upgrades to networks.
- Stratospheric systems can provide significant ATG services in either 1.5 or 2.5 MHz licenses.

Combinatorial Bidding Offers Viable Market-Based Compromise

- An exclusive license allocation would best serve the development of the ATG market and the public interest. Space Data, however, suggests a compromise that takes into account the other licensing proposals.
- The ATG auction can be designed so that bidders determine whether exclusive or overlapping licenses are assigned, and thus the best use of the four MHz of ATG spectrum.
- The ATG spectrum can be divided into four auctionable frequency blocks, which can be combined.

Proposed Bidding Package


Proposed scheme with package bidding:

A Block: exclusive use 1.5 MHz

B Block: exclusive use 1.5 MHz perhaps with an initial period of sharing with the legacy ATG network


C Block: shared use of 1.0 MHz

D Block: shared use of 1.0 MHz



Current Licensing Schemes Being Considered

Equivalent Schemes With Package Bidding



Combinatorial Bidding

- A licensee interested in an exclusive 2.5 MHz license would bid on the A, C and D Blocks. The second winning bidder would have an exclusive 1.5 MHz license.
- A licensee interested in overlapping 2.5 MHz licenses would bid on the A and C Block or the B and D Block.

Three-Block Bidding Alternative

- In the alternative, the ATG spectrum could be divided into three exclusive blocks (A, B and C Blocks, each 1.33 MHz). A licensee interested in an exclusive 2.66 MHz license would bid on the A and B Blocks. The second winning bidder would have an exclusive 1.33 MHz license.
- The 1.33 MHz license can support narrowband technologies, such as iDEN, to provide voice, Internet access and SMS.
- Allows some guard band spectrum for CDMA in a 2.66 MHz license.

An ATG Auction Must Include:

- Cross-ownership restrictions.
 - Prohibiting one entity (or two affiliated entities) from holding all ATG licenses will ensure competition rather than the allow one carrier to monopolize ATG services.
 - Consistent with the FCC's approach to ensuring competition in other developing wireless markets.
- Bidding credits.
 - Encourages small businesses to invest in and deploy ATG networks.

Personal Handsets Offer Most Effective Competition For ATG Calls

- Effective competition requires more than one ATG provider to be accessible on an airplane. Use of personal handsets the most effective solution.
- Interference issues are being addressed by the FAA/ RTCA. The FCC should not preclude use of handsets if FAA lifts its restrictions.

Summary

- To provide true competition the consumer must have a choice of wireless providers in the cabin.
- The Staff's two-exclusive license proposal is realistic and feasible to implement from a technical and policy perspective.
- Stratospheric systems are fully capable of providing significant ATG services in either 1.5 or 2.5 MHz licenses.
- Verizon's exclusive license proposal provides no customer choice.
- Aircell's and Boeing's shared spectrum proposals would be cumbersome to implement and would stifle development of ATG services.
- An auction using combinatorial bidding packages would provide a viable market-based compromise between licensing proposals.